The Global Alliance for Improved Nutrition (GAIN) 
Background
Food fortification is widely accepted as a cost-effective intervention strategy to improve nutrition status at the level of the population as a whole. In higher-income industrialized countries, fortification has proven to be highly successful in reducing and preventing vitamin and mineral deficiencies [1, 2] . Although there are fewer experiences in lower-income countries [1] , fortification of staple foods with essential nutrients has been increasingly viewed as a key public health strategy to address the global burden of micronutrient malnutrition. This has been reaffirmed by a number of international bodies. In 1994 the World Bank, referring to food fortification, stated that "probably no other technology available today offers as large an opportunity to improve lives and accelerate development at such low cost and in such a short time" [3] . Moreover, nutrition has been consistently ranked by the Copenhagen Consensus meetings of 2004, 2008 , and 2012 as one of the top global intervention strategies to advance human welfare [4, 5] .
The major advantages of food fortification as a nutrition intervention at the population level are the low cost of fortifying staple foods and the potential to deliver additional micronutrients to large segments of the population without changing their food consumption patterns [1] . Yet implementation and scale-up have proven to be complex in lower-income countries. Early lessons have provided important insights into the viability and sustainability of fortification programs and have clearly highlighted that close collaboration between the public and private sectors is a prerequisite for effective and sustainable programs.
The Global Alliance for Improved Nutrition (GAIN) was established in 2002 with a mandate to galvanize the public and private sectors to end malnutrition. GAIN launched its first large-scale fortification program in 2003, and in less than a decade has scaled its operations to reach more than 610 million people with nutritionally enhanced foods (figs. 1 and 2). Positive results have emerged from experiences in South Africa and China. Neural tube defects were reduced by 30% in South Africa after folic acid was added to maize meal and wheat flour. In China, data collected from 21 sentinel sites showed that anemia dropped by more than 30% following the fortification of soy sauce with iron. These results have been achieved by investing in and working alongside governments, businesses, civil society partners, and academia through complex S374 R. Moench-Pfanner and M. Van Ameringen large-scale partnerships in more than 30 countries. GAIN is increasingly seen as a robust platform for brokering novel partnerships and launching innovative models to scale up nutrition programs. Large-scale fortification was GAIN's first programmatic area and remains a major focus of GAIN's work today. However, over the last 10 years GAIN has expanded into new program areas, including Maternal, Infant, and Young Child Nutrition (MIYCN), and improvements in agricultural practices to enhance nutrition, in order to respond to the specific nutritional needs of large segments of the population, especially the most vulnerable. Operationally, GAIN's approach to program delivery has become more nuanced with the layering of targeted and business-led projects over national food fortification programs. At the same time, a FIG. 1. Map of GAIN program reach. In less than a decade, GAIN has scaled its operations to reach more than 610 million people with nutritionally enhanced food products GAIN has evolved considerably both as a program and as an organization. A number of lessons learned can be distilled from its first decade of operations. The present paper reviews GAIN's approach to food fortification and how it has changed strategically and operationally in response to programmatic experiences and changes in the nutrition landscape.
Prologue to GAIN
During most of the 20th century, food fortification had successfully contributed to reductions in micronutrient deficiencies in Europe, North America, and much of South America, but had not gained much traction in most of Africa and Asia, not surprisingly the two continents contributing most to the global burden of malnutrition [1] . Program financing in many highburden countries was historically scarce and unreliable, and food fortification had a relatively low profile as a public health intervention [3] . Few large-scale national fortification programs were funded and operational, and globally there was a leadership gap to spearhead the scale-up for fortification, particularly around the task of high-level private sector engagement.
By the turn of the millennium, with increasing awareness raised by donors and key advocacy documents released by the World Bank [6] and the United Nations System Standing Committee on Nutrition [7] , a critical mass of support formed to set up a dedicated and globally focused body to spearhead global advocacy and fund country-level projects. Initially proposed as a new initiative in the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation (BMGF) in 2000, GAIN was established in 2002 at a Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly on Children [8] . The initial funding for GAIN was provided by BMGF, the US Agency for International Development (USAID), and the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA). The architects of GAIN envisaged the need for an entirely new organization to address major barriers impeding progress in the fight against the scourge of malnutrition. The overarching founding vision for the organization viewed the international institutional framework of the day as deeply fragmented, uncoordinated, and based on delivery models that were both inadequate to the magnitude of the need and inherently unsustainable. The vision held that it would be necessary to establish new institutional arrangements that would * The GAIN Premix Facility is a centralized procurement and certification service focused on facilitating sourcing of vitamin and mineral premix.
mobilize the energies and resources of the private sector, establish innovative public-private partnerships, and catalyze the adoption of new and sustainable delivery systems. The initial decision was to champion the concept of a major new push for improved nutrition on a global scale, initially through food fortification, working closely together with the private sector and leveraging partnerships to achieve the maximum possible scale of impact. Focus on partnership was needed to address a major gap in current efforts, which was only partly a matter of financing but was much more profoundly related to systemic issues.
The early years: 2002 to 2005
During GAIN's initial years -from 2002 to 2005 -the organization operated within the United Nations system, with its Secretariat in Geneva functioning as a donor body for large-scale, national (or in some large countries, regional) fortification programs of staple foods or condiments. The focus on fortification reflected a growing consensus that food fortification was one of the most cost-effective development interventions, but the model to take it to scale and demonstrate impact at that level had not yet been tested. GAIN funded country-level programs based on periodic competitive requests for proposals. The initial management approach was adopted with the intention to maximize the ownership of each supported country program by national stakeholders, and administrative oversight and monitoring were generally provided through agreements with experienced partners in different areas, such as the United Nations Development Program, the United Nations Office for Project Services, and the World Bank.
The multistakeholder nature of food fortification programs was institutionalized from the very start by GAIN's requirement that all country programs be governed by a National Fortification Alliance or similar stakeholder platform. These alliances brought together different private sector partners (e.g., millers, oil refiners, bakers, and premix suppliers), government agencies (e.g., Ministry of Health, Ministry of Industry, Food Control Agency, Bureau of Standards), civil society (e.g., consumer associations or nongovernmental organizations working on nutrition and health communication), researchers, and others. The National Fortification Alliance submitted a project proposal to GAIN in response to the request for proposals (altogether, five calls for proposals were implemented). The activities of the National Fortification Alliance were facilitated by an Executing Agency, which was awarded the grant and was accountable for the project's financial management at the country level. In an effort to maximize the likelihood of sustainability and country ownership, national public sector agencies were encouraged to take on the Executing Agency function. National organizations, S376 R. Moench-Pfanner and M. Van Ameringen such as the Ministry of Health, Ministry of Industry, or Bureau of Standards, were thought to be best placed to garner political support, convene multisector partners, and mobilize their agencies' national networks for implementation of quality control and social marketing activities. GAIN relied on a separately contracted, in-country program advisor to monitor and report on activities and expenditures. These in-country program advisors were sourced from the United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS) or drawn from consulting firms such as PricewaterhouseCoopers.
Project funding was initially provided for 3 years, a period thought sufficient for a national fortification program to achieve full-scale implementation. At this stage, projects were expected to become sustainable, with recurrent costs for inputs like premix, quality control supplies, and social marketing to be absorbed by governments and the private sector or passed on to consumers. Management responsibilities were to be integrated permanently into existing institutional structures of government and industrial partners.
Early lessons learned
Lessons learned from GAIN's early years prompted various changes in its operations model. Most importantly, GAIN decided to take a more direct approach to many programmatic, technical, and operational decisions, from selection of countries where it would invest, to expanding its partnerships and tailoring its technical assistance more strategically to help projects overcome specific barriers to success. GAIN was established as an independent Swiss foundation, headquartered in Geneva in 2003, but it was operationally under the United Nations and the World Bank until mid-2005. After this date, GAIN exited all administrative arrangements with the United Nations and began operating as an independent entity. In doing so, GAIN adapted its structure to become more operational, adding technical and administrative staff and developing a more sophisticated management system to support the scale-up of activities worldwide. In 2008, after 3 years of operating under this model, GAIN initiated a midterm review of its large-scale fortification program. Several issues had been identified that would help refine the approach and support the achievement of impact at scale:
The request for proposal process of project selection targeted countries with both public health need and the capacity to implement programs; GAIN originally welcomed all developing countries to apply to the request for proposal. Despite the fact that mainly countries with the highest malnutrition burdens submitted proposals, GAIN's initial project portfolio also included some relatively low-burden countries based on very strong proposals.
In low-income countries with high burdens of vitamin and mineral deficiencies, the poorest and most nutritionally vulnerable living in rural areas were often less likely to consume industrially produced, fortifiable staple foods.
Project governance and management were challenging. When functioning properly, the National Fortification Alliance structure proved successful as a platform for dialogue and coordination among multisector players. However, these alliances were not always representative of all sectors, were sometimes overly formal and nonparticipatory, and generally met too infrequently to be of use in problem-solving or day-to-day key decision-making. Likewise, Executing Agencies were not always optimal. Public sector bureaucracies could sometimes add unnecessary administrative delays to key activities such as equipment or premix procurement that slowed projects down. The private sector, which relied on government agencies to set fortification standards, determine quality testing procedures, and regulate other aspects of fortification, became frustrated with unforeseen delays and sometimes lost interest while projects were delayed by politics and planning.
The 3-year time frame for laying the foundation of a sustainable food fortification program was unrealistic. It proved much more difficult and time-consuming to enact mandatory fortification legislation, create and sustain the operations of government quality control bodies, create consumer awareness and demand for fortified products, and generally integrate fortification into existing government plans and budgets than initially anticipated. Without these foundational building blocks, companies had little incentive to continue fortifying their products after the project ended. Initially, GAIN did not offer any mechanism for follow-on financial and technical support, so projects would end and fortification would not be sustained.
GAIN initially relied heavily on National Fortification Alliances and external in-country program advisors for project oversight and had minimal management staff, processes, and tools with which to identify potential barriers to project progress. Although this initially highly decentralized model was intended to empower countries to solve their own problems, their experience with food fortification was too limited to address all the issues that arose during program implementation. Reporting turn-around times were such that problems were discovered only after it was too late to assist, and projects stalled.
Growth and more targeted support
To further accelerate program roll-out and provide more targeted support, from 2007 onwards GAIN made four key strategic changes to how food fortification programs were selected and managed.
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Development of complementary approaches for the delivery of fortification
GAIN adapted a new conceptual framework that acknowledged the limitations of large-scale fortification to reach the entire population in some countries. As shown in figure 3 , the framework shows how different program delivery models might complement one another by reaching different segments of the market. The vertical axis represents the extent of the population to be reached by the fortification strategy, while the horizontal axis represents the cost-recovery potential of the initiative. The closer the delivery model is to the right of the box, the greater the reliance on marketbased factors, and the more sustainability can be realized through pricing. Program models closer to the left side of the box target more vulnerable populations that have greater nutritional needs but are less likely to be able to pay for the value added. These models rely more heavily on public financing and subsidies to assure high coverage and sustained effort.
This conceptual framework articulates the need to layer different approaches to reach different segments of the population in the same country. The aim of the layered approach is twofold: first, to reach as much of the total population as possible; and second, to ensure that targeted nutrition interventions meet the needs of specific high-burden groups.
The layered approach required a change in GAIN's programming model. Rather than focusing exclusively on public-private coalitions for large-scale food fortification, GAIN began to expand programming to include support for more targeted and complementary initiatives, including business-led, public sector-led, and civil society-led projects targeting specific vulnerable population groups. In large countries with a high burden of malnutrition, such as India, Bangladesh, Kenya, and Nigeria, GAIN aimed to develop a portfolio of projects layered on top of each other to maximize coverage of the population and impact.
The limitations of large-scale food fortification to reach the most nutritionally vulnerable -especially children aged 6 to 24 months* -was an obvious gap to be filled (despite this, it should be noted that although staple food products do not specifically address all of the micronutrient needs of infants and children, * 6 to 24 months refers to children from 6 months to under 2 years of age. [9] and the US and Irish Government-led 1,000 Days Initiative [10] . Based on learning in IYCN programs, GAIN played an active role in helping to launch both of these initiatives. Building on the momentum of its own programs and the increased attention within the international community to IYCN, by the end of 2011, GAIN had launched 10 IYCN program projects in 8 countries. During 2010/11, more than 325 million servings of specially formulated products were sold or distributed in GAINsupported projects. More recently, the target group was expanded to encompass pregnant and lactating women in recognition of the importance of maternal nutrition to the health and development of infants and young children during the critical 1,000 days window of opportunity [10] . In the same period that GAIN launched its IYCN program, it also launched a joint program with UNICEF on universal salt iodization in recognition of the substantial impact that iodine deficiency has on population health and cognitive development. GAIN and UNICEF partnered on the Universal Salt Iodization (USI) Partnership project to develop and pilot new models for salt iodization [11] . The GAIN-UNICEF USI Partnership is active in 13 priority countries, most with very low coverage of adequately iodized salt and all with a high burden of iodine deficiency: Bangladesh, China (select provinces), Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, India, Indonesia, Niger, Pakistan, Philippines, Russia, Senegal, and Ukraine. The project aims to reach 90% of households in these countries, representing approximately 700 million people to be newly reached with iodized salt of adequate quality. Innovative approaches include the piloting of cooperative salt banks and the introduction of management information systems to track salt production and quality. GAIN has also pioneered stand-alone, business-led projects to deliver nutritious foods to low-income consumers. In 2005, the GAIN Business Alliance was formed to encourage global-, regional-, and national-scale businesses to leverage new investments in business models that contribute to reducing undernutrition at scale [12] . As of early 2012, the Business Alliance has 24 members dedicated to developing market-based strategies to fight malnutrition. To name a few examples: In 2011, Ajinomoto, a food company based in Japan, began testing a soybased micronutrient powder that offers the potential of nutritional impact for both urban and rural consumers in Ghana. Also in 2011, the Bel Groupe launched a new milk-based food product in Vietnam designed specifically for schoolchildren. From 2008 to 2011, Grameen, Danone Foods, and GAIN studied the impact of a new fortified yogurt on children's physical and cognitive development. Preliminary results are positive*, and Grameen and Danone are now exploring opportunities to sustainably produce and market the product to low-income consumers in Bangladesh and other areas. Based on learning from a 2007 school lunch program, the large Indian food producer Britannia is fortifying the 4.5 to 5 billion biscuits it sells widely to consumers in both rural and urban India each year. Also in India, in 2008 Cargill committed to fortifying its top-selling edible oil brands [13] .
Targeting of country selection to increase benefits and impact
In order to maximize the impact of its resources, GAIN defined a new approach to the selection of countries for investment in nutrition. It first analyzed data on child mortality and the magnitude of vitamin and mineral deficiencies and stunting globally to identify high-priority countries and, within that group, the countries where the most disability-adjusted life years (DALYs) could be saved. DALYs are a measure of overall disease burden, expressed as the number of years lost due to ill-health, disability, or early death resulting from deficiencies in iron, vitamin A, and zinc. GAIN also undertook more detailed landscape analyses in some of the largest countries in this group, including Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, Kenya, and Nigeria, to investigate programmatic opportunities. Proactive advocacy missions supported the establishment and effective functioning of National Fortification Alliances and encouraged local stakeholders to develop and submit project proposals. As of 2011, GAIN had large-scale food fortification projects in development or under way in over 20 countries with a high burden of malnutrition, as well as programs in MIYCN (in over 6 countries), school feeding (in 2 countries), and USI (in 13 countries in partnership with UNICEF). 
Supporting critical programmatic and technical inputs
In order to strengthen program delivery, GAIN realized it had to play a more prominent role in the management of its field programs. To achieve this, GAIN developed a program delivery framework and over 40 program management tools and templates to improve the functioning and oversight of its grant-making operations. The specific objectives of GAIN's program delivery framework are to reduce the risk of investment and ensure the highest possible social returns, improve resource management, improve the quality and timeliness of project delivery, and clarify the roles and responsibilities of GAIN staff and implementing partners in project management. GAIN's program delivery framework lays out five stages of project development -conceptualization; initiation; planning, review, and approval; implementation; and close-out and evaluation -to improve decision-making and guide project implementation. It includes clear guidelines and reporting templates for project implementers and provides an early warning system for GAIN to identify challenges or stumbling blocks to project progress. Moreover, a new policy was instituted to expand the duration of GAIN support from 3 years to up to 5 years, as well as a new phase II financing policy to provide follow-on funding to certain projects based on set criteria and following a prescribed process.
GAIN also identified the need to provide more direct assistance to help projects overcome specific technical stumbling blocks. A serious problem for many early programs was premix procurement. The first cohort of GAIN-supported projects struggled to procure competitively priced, high-quality premix in an efficient and timely manner. Many programs or food producers in lower-income countries were unable to verify the quality of imported premix; in-country testing facilities were inadequate, and long-distance travel to directly inspect facilities was often not feasible. Financing premix, the single most expensive recurring expense for fortification programs, in countries where industry has only limited access to credit, was also identified as a significant challenge. To address these barriers, GAIN developed a global vitamin and mineral premix procurement facility in 2009. The facility included a revolving fund to provide credit to purchasers and a quality certification and quality assurance program [14] . By the end of 2011, the GAIN Premix Facility had procured and delivered premix to 129 projects or customers and was reaching 170 million consumers in 30 countries.
Establishment of an enabling environment through advocacy, policy, and communications
Whereas the costs and benefits of nutrition interventions are widely understood and are convincing to a professional audience, project support and ultimate success depend to a large extent on the commitment and actions of policy makers who may not be aware of the impact of poor nutrition on public health and healthcare costs. They may also be unaware of the 2% to 3% negative impact that poor nutrition can have on gross domestic product [10] . Even though nutrition is relevant to the achievement of several of the Millennium Development Goals, it has until recently received very little attention from major international policy forums on progress toward the Millennium Development Goals. In the absence of international support, nationallevel policy makers are often reluctant to create an enabling environment for successful nutrition programs. Thus, by 2004, only 11 of 80 developing countries had enacted mandatory wheat flour fortification legislation. GAIN decided to do more to focus the attention of policy makers on nutrition by providing them with a strong evidence base to motivate action. At the global level, GAIN would participate in a wide array of events and conferences and engage in international discussions on nutrition. At the country level, GAIN would increase its in-country presence and work to identify the key roadblocks to access by vulnerable communities to affordable and nutritious foods.
In 2008, GAIN began a major review of its programs and positioning, which involved consultations with many of GAIN's board members, stakeholders, and program partners. This resulted in the approval by the GAIN board of a new strategy for 2010 to 2015. The measures outlined above were incorporated in the new strategy, which is now being implemented.
GAIN's approach moving forward
In its decade of existence, GAIN has established itself as an innovative and flexible player in the fight against malnutrition. As an organization with a mandate to galvanize both the public and the private sectors, GAIN has pioneered innovative models of collaboration in the nutrition sector and has led the way toward recognition of the key role of business in delivering more nutritious foods to poor consumers. As GAIN enters its second decade, it will continue to respond to the challenge of the changing nutrition landscape by introducing new programs and more innovative partnerships and refining its delivery models to maximize the accessibility of high-quality affordable food, and ultimately to maximize health impact. Moreover, the organization intends to play an increasingly important brokering role, bringing governments, the private sector, international organizations, and academia together in innovative partnerships that can significantly reduce global malnutrition.
